Political economy theories of financial development argue that in countries where a narrow elite controls political decisions, financial development may be obstructed to deny access to finance to potential competitors. We use panel data on developed and developing countries from 1975-2000 to examine this hypothesis, as well as looking at the effect of regime transitions on financial development. Our results show that the degree of democracy and political stability explain differences in the speed of financial development and that including these regime characteristics makes legal origin variables obsolete.
1: Introduction
The economic literature studying the effect of financial development on growth has provided ample evidence that financial development has a positive effect on long-run economic growth.
1 Establishing well-functioning financial markets and financial institutions, which attract savings and channel them to productive investment projects, should therefore be a policy priority for governments. In recent years the research agenda has turned to the question of why many countries nevertheless remain financially underdeveloped.
There are a number of potential explanations for and empirical studies of why financial development has been slow in a large number of countries. The research broadly falls into three interrelated groups. The first group stresses that financial institutions do not succeed in an institutional vacuum, but need a legal and regulatory environment in which contracts can be enforced and bankers are given strong incentives to behave honestly. 2 The second group looks at the links between law and finance, showing that specific types of legal system are more conducive to protecting investor rights and adapting the law to take into account financial innovations. 3 The third group looks at the political economy of financial development arguing that financial underdevelopment may be the outcome of political circumstancesprotecting the interests of a narrow political / industrial elite. 4 Such an elite may have little interest in developing well-functioning capital markets, as they are served well by relationship banking and the absence of arms' length finance restricts potential competitors' access to finance.
This paper aims to contribute to the second and third of these arguments by empirically evaluating the influence of the political system on financial development.
For this we study the effect of political variables, which capture the degree to which a narrow elite controls the levers of power and the level of regime stability on the change in financial development. We use panel data of developed and developing countries from 1975 to 2000. We study a number of different aspects of financial development. We control for legal origin as well as for exogenous factors driving financial development and test whether the importance of political institutions differs between legal systems and different time periods.
Our results show that both the degree of democracy in the political system and the stability of the political system have statistically significant effects on the annual change in financial development. To the extent that democracy restricts the influence of elite groups and lobbies by widening political participation, our results provide evidence for the Rajan and Zingales (2003) proposition that political systems governed by narrow elites obstruct the development of the financial system.
Controlling for political regime characteristics directly makes legal origin indicators obsolete and provides an important addition to the "settler mortality hypothesis", which argues that development is shaped by colonisation strategies.
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The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review of the literature and section 3 describes the data used. The methodology is discussed in section 4 and results are presented and discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2: Literature Review
The theoretical literature predicts that financial development is a positive function of real income and the real interest rate. 6 Financial markets promote investment through debt intermediation and hence generate economic growth. Economic development in turn creates demand for finance, so the likely causal effect between financial development and economic growth is bi-directional. 7 A positive real interest rate increases the volume of savings, increasing financial depth and at the same time improves the average productivity of capital by making investment in low return projects unattractive; this in turn boosts growth. 8 More recently, however, academic inquiry has turned to explanations of why in some countries the virtuous cycle of economic and financial development is slow to take off.
Institutional underdevelopment
Economic development in general and financial development in particular relies on good governance. 9 Financial systems need to be regulated and supervised to ensure that saver confidence is not undermined by bank failures and that savings are channelled to the most productive investments rather than into the pockets of connected individuals, or gambled away on high-risk projects. 10 The empirical relationship between financial liberalisation and financial crises depends strongly on a 5 Acemoglu (2001), Beck et al (2003a) , discussed in detail below. 6 McKinnon (1973) , Shaw (1973) 7 Demetriades and Hussein (1996) 8 Fry (1997) 9 Kaufmann et al (1999) , Hellmann et al (2000) , Akerlof and Romer (1993) 10 Hellmann et al (2000) , also see Perotti (2001) on the case of Russia country's institutional environment. 11 Respect for the rule of law, a low level of corruption and good contract enforcement are crucial for the efficient functioning of a financial system. This literature therefore argues that booms and busts in the financial sector and the resulting financial underdevelopment are due to governments' inability to address institutional shortcomings or a lack of understanding of the foundations of a sound financial system and hence badly sequenced reforms.
Legal and institutional heritage
The literature on Law and Finance, however, points to a more fundamental problem:
some legal systems are not well suited to creating the preconditions for the successful development of financial systems and institutions. 12 Financial development (especially arms' length finance) depends on enforcement of outsiders' property rights. The "static" view of law and finance looks at differences in legal traditions regarding the comparative rights of individual investors vis-à-vis the state. Common law systems were designed to protect investor property against the Crown, creating systems in which individuals transact confidently. Civil law on the other hand sets the state above the courts and therefore the interests of politically connected heads of firms above individual investors.
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The "dynamic" view of law and finance looks at the adaptability of law to changing conditions, giving flexible legal systems an advantage in fostering financial development. 14 Common law emerges on a case-by-case basis, so the gap between an economy's needs and the law is quickly closed. On the other extreme is the immutable legal code of French civil law (though in practice French law has not been static). The more hurdles there are to legal reform, the less investor protection there is at the cutting edge of financial innovation, tending to slow down financial development. One way in which the second puzzle of diverging performance within legal origin groups has been addressed is to pay attention to the colonisation strategy employed in different countries. Acemoglu (2001) argues that in countries with high mortality rates for European colonisers, institutions were set up to allow a small elite to extract precious raw materials. 17 When the colonisers left, post-colonial elites took over the same institutions to continue to extract surpluses. In more benign climates, Europeans settled and established institutions to protect long-run economic interests. 18 Once a particular system has been set up, it advantages the interest groups benefiting from the system within the political process. Hence even inefficient systems are perpetuated;
there is "path dependence". 19 The "settler mortality" hypothesis has been directly applied to financial development in Beck et al (2003) , providing empirical evidence that the institutional endowment matters.
Political economy
Another way of looking at the divergent performance of countries with similar legal systems over time is to look at the political system in which decisions about economic policies are made. North (1990) and Olson (1993) However, this methodology does not directly address the question of the importance of the domestic political system in financial development. There are no variables describing the political regime characteristics directly. Therefore the focus of this paper is the effect of domestic regime characteristics on the speed of financial 21 La Porta et al (2001) , also see the literature on state ownership of banks 22 Aided in this perhaps by a civil law system that favours centralisation of power. 23 Both trade and financial openness variables are chosen to be exogenous to the political process: the decision to open trade and capital flows is in itself political. The trade openness proxy is based on a development. We firstly examine the effect of the extent to which political system restricts suffrage. In autocratic regimes the interests of a narrow elite consisting of those holding capital in labour-rich economies (and especially the owners of statesponsored "infant industries") may prevail against the interests of labour, the unemployed and potential new entrants. Therefore the more concentrated power and the more non-democratic the system, the more likely it is, that a small industrial elite of the type described by Rajan and Zingales (2003) can use its control over policymaking to restrict financial development. Secondly we aim to capture the effect of political instability on financial development. We would expect a negative effect from major changes in the polity, as social capital is destroyed.
3: Data
The focus of this paper is on the factors that facilitate, restrict or reverse financial development. The aspect of financial development we are most interested in from a political economy point of view is how easy it is for any investor (not just the wellconnected ones) to obtain finance for investment projects. That is we are looking for indicators of "arms-length finance". We look at three indicators of financial development:
• Private sector credit /GDP
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• Stock market capitalisation / GDP To proxy for the extent of incumbent power we use the "combined polity score" -polity2 28 -as measured by the Polity IV database (Marshall et al 2003) . 29 The Polity variable was designed to record the regime's institutionalized authority characteristics.
Firstly, the database records a democracy score (ranging from 0 to 10) for each country, based on the openness of the political process (i.e. the extent to which citizens can effectively express preferences about policies and leaders through elections) and the degree of restraints on the powers of the chief executive. The maximum score would be allocated to a democracy in which the executive is chosen in free and fair elections with universal suffrage and there are substantial checks and balances constraining the chief executive's power. 30 Secondly each country has an autocracy score (again ranging from 0 to 10) based on how political leaders are 32 For example South Africa in the 1980s has a democracy score of 7 and an autocracy score of 3, reflecting that within a relatively democratic system political participation was restricted to white South Africans. 33 Acemoglu (2003), Pagano and Volpin (2003) 34 Herfindahl index: the Herfindahl index increases in the concentration of power within parliament with the highest score going to single-party states. This proxy again reflects the competitiveness of elections on the one hand and the restrictions on the power of the executive. The regression results are extremely similar to the ones using the polity2 indicator and are available upon request.
occupation in continental Europe in the 1940s. Table 1a provides some summary statistics of the changes in the financial development indicators and the level of political variables employed in the paper. The countries with the fastest financial development are considerably more democratic and stable than the median, while those countries that experience financial disintermediation are on average highly autocratic and /or have unstable regimes.
We control for trade openness as suggested by Rajan and Zingales (2003), again noting that a country's actual openness is partly endogenous to the political process. In the Rajan and Zingales (2003) paper the international capital mobility is measured at the level of the international system. 37 This is again to avoid the problem that actual capital mobility is a political choice-certain types of governments are more likely to liberalise capital flows. 38 In this paper, changes in international capital mobility, which affect all countries simultaneously, are captured through time and period dummies 39 .
35 Linnemann (1966) 36 As the data are based on geography alone, there is no variation from 1975 -2000, except Ethiopia, and Germany (and some post-Soviet states, which in any case have no data availability before the early 1990s). 37 Proxied by the "mean absolute value of current account / GDP over five-year periods for a sample of 14 developed countries." From Taylor (1998) 38 e.g. Alesina et al (1994) , Haggard and Maxfield (1996) , Li and Smith (2003) 39 Period 1 = 1976 Period 1 = -1980 Period 1 = , period 2 = 1981 Period 1 = -1985 Period 1 = , period 3 = 1986 Period 1 = -1990 Period 1 = , period 4 = 1991 Period 1 = -1995 Period 1 = , period 5 = 1996 Period 1 = -2000 We control for the origin of a country's legal system. We augmented the data presented in La Porta et al (1998) from CIA World Factbook entry for the legal system. We excluded countries with entries that did not fit neatly into the five original legal origin categories and introduced a new category for post-Socialist civil law codes from 1990 for the same reason. 40 We report results using a civil law dummy grouping the German, French, Scandinavian and post-Socialist civil law countries together, as there appears to be no difference between the different civil law countries.
Finally we control for whether a country has recently experienced a banking crisis.
Widespread public loss of confidence may result in a discontinuity in financial development. We cannot use the contemporary banking crisis dummy as the definition of banking crises contains "widespread bank runs" -in turn linked to the contraction of the deposit base, which is one of the dependent variables. 41 We therefore use a lagged dummy taken from data in Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and Glick and Hutchinson (1999) . Table 1b provides preliminary evidence in favour of the hypotheses outlined above in the form of correlation coefficients between the variables. A higher democracy score is positively correlated with all proxies for the speed of financial development, with the expected negative correlation between concentration of power and financial development. Greater regime stability has positive effects on financial development, as has intrinsic openness to trade. Bank crises have negative effects on financial development, while lagged growth has a positive effect on the banking sector variables and a negative effect on the stock market.
4: Methodology
We perform the regressions using annual data from 1975 -2000 in so far that they are available. Three variants of each model are estimated: (i) and (iv) the effect of the political variable (polity2) is assumed to be the same across all periods and countries
(ii) and (v) the effect of polity2 is allowed to vary by legal origin of the countries in the sample and (iii) and (vi) the effect of polity2 is allowed to vary across periods.
Regression equations
Firstly we look at short-run financial development:
∆ FD it = β 0 + β 1 elite it + β 2 stability it + β 3 openness i + β 4 legal origin i + β 5 financial crisis it-1 + β 6 GDPgrowth it-1 + β 7-32 time dummies + ε it (i) ∆ FD it = β 0 + β 1 elite it + β 2 elite it *legal origin i + β 3 stability it + β 4 openness i + β 5 legal origin i + β 6 financial crisis it-1 + β 7 GDPgrowth it-1 + β 8-33 time dummies + ε it (ii) ∆ FD it = β 0 + β 1 elite it + β 2 elite it *period dummies + β 3 stability it + β 4 openness i + β 5 legal origin i + β 6 financial crisis it-1 + β 7 GDPgrowth it-1 + β 8-33 time dummies + ε it (iii)
We then look at the relationship between changes in financial development and the past level of financial development:
∆ FD it = β 0 + β 1 elite it + β 2 stability it + β 3 openness i + β 4 legal origin i + β 5 financial crisis it-1 + β 6 GDPgrowth it-1 + β 7 FD it-1 + β 8-33 time dummies + ε it (iv) ∆ FD it = β 0 + β 1 elite it + β 2 elite it *legal origin i + β 3 stability it + β 4 openness i + β 5 legal origin i + β 6 financial crisis it-1 + β 7 GDPgrowth it-1 + β 8 FD it-1 + β 9-34 time dummies + ε it (v) ∆ FD it = β 0 + β 1 elite it + β 2 elite it *period dummies + β 3 stability it + β 4 openness i + β 5 legal origin i + β 6 financial crisis it-1 + β 7 GDPgrowth it-1 + β 8 FD it-1 + β 9-34 time eliminates observations for which Cook's distance exceeds 1 -these are the gross outliers. Thereafter, robust regression involves an iterative weighted least squares method whereby outliers are identified and weights are assigned.
The two estimation procedures outlined above (i.e. OLS and outlier robust regressions) assume that the political variables are exogenous to the model determining the growth of financial development. In the course of our empirical investigation we have relaxed this assumption and employ a generalised method of moments (GMM) procedure due to Hansen (1982) . To this end twice lagged values of the polity2 variable interacted with the legal origin dummies are used as instrumental variable candidates. We are careful to check the appropriateness of the instrumental variable candidates in two respects. First, their validity in the sense of having no correlation with the equation error is formally tested with the aid of Hansen's (1982) test for overidentifying restrictions (which is the robust version of the classical Sargan test statistic). Second, we ascertain that they are relevant in that they exhibit sufficiently strong correlation with the potentially endogenous regressor (i.e. polity2).
It has been noted in the econometric literature that when the partial correlation between the instruments and the endogenous variable is low, instrumental variables regression is biased in the direction of OLS estimator (see e.g. Staiger and Stock, 1997). Staiger and Stock (1997) recommend that the F-statistics 43 (or the partial Rsquare values) from the first-stage regression be routinely reported in applied work. A high partial R-squared of the excluded instruments or a large F-statistic suggests the instruments are relevant, instrumental variable or GMM estimates are reliable in finite samples. By contrast, when the F-statistic is small or the partial R-square value is low, inference based on instrumental variable estimates would be unreliable. Reassuringly we find that our instruments are appropriate on both counts (see Table A of the appendix). A comparison of the OLS and GMM estimates via Hausman test statistics reveals that the two are not systematically different, suggesting that the assumption of exogeneity of the polity2 variable is justified. For this reason we restrict our discussion to the results obtained from the OLS and outlier-robust regressions, and the GMM estimates are relegated to the appendix 43 The F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the instruments should be excluded from the first-stage regressions. Table 2 presents results for equation (i), in which the pure polity indicator is used.
5: Results
The polity proxy has a positive coefficient, showing that more democratic countries tend to have faster financial development, as predicted by the political economy literature. The proxy is highly statistically significant in the banking sector regressions, but insignificant in 3 out of the four stock market regressions. The second political regime proxy, durability, has a positive coefficient: countries, which have not experienced a major regime transition for a long time tend to have faster financial development than those, which have more recently gone through major upheaval.
Durability is statistically significant in all regression specifications. A civil law system appears to be a statistically significant explanatory variable for stock market capitalisation in the outlier robust regression, but with an unexpected positive coefficient. Otherwise civil law is not significant, once political regime characteristics are controlled for. 44 Socialist legal origin on the other hand enters as a significant variable with an unexpected positive coefficient. 45 Of the control variables the lagged banking crisis has the expected negative effect in 5 out of 6 specifications, significant at least at the 5% level. Lagged GDP growth appears to have the expected positive effect on the banking system variable (significant at the 1% level), but none on stock market development. Finally there is some evidence that countries naturally more open to trade have faster banking sector development, while there may be negative effects on the stock market. Table 3 presents results for the polity indicator interacted with the legal origin categories (regression ii). The polity proxy again has the expected positive coefficient in all regressions, but is only significant for three of the regressions. The interaction term between polity and civil law is only significant (and negative) in one regression specification. The significant, but mostly negative coefficient of the polity score interacted with Socialist legal origin is likely to be driven by the recent good performance of the Chinese economy despite its closed political system. The 44 When the legal origins are separated into French, German, Scandinavian and Post-Socialist none is statistically significant, so for brevity the variables are summarised in one dummy. 45 However, these results are based on a very narrow set of data, with only China reporting on its burgeoning stock market in the 1990s and the banking sector observations based on observations from Poland, Hungary in the 1980s and China in the 1990s. durability proxy is again statistically significant and positive. Banking crises have statistically significant negative effects in 5 out of the 6 regressions. Again predisposition to trading and lagged GDP growth both contribute to banking sector development, with apparently negative effects on the stock market. Given that narrow elites would be more likely to develop (potentially relationshipbased) banking than arms' length financial markets, it is surprising that the effects of the polity variables in the stock market regressions are less robust than for the banking sector. Note, however, the stock market regression results are based on a sample that is about half the sample size of the banking sector development. When looking at the sub-sample of countries in which stock market capitalisation is observed (using crosssectional time-series logit analysis) it emerges that the probability of observing stock market data rises significantly in durable and / or democratic regimes. 47 The regression results on the stock market variables reported above therefore systematically under-estimate the importance of the political regime characteristics. Tables 10 and 11 show that when making these assumptions, the effects of both polity variables on stock market capitalisation and stock market trade are now highly statistically significant.
6: Conclusions
From our panel data analysis political regime characteristics have emerged as significant factors influencing the speed of financial development, alongside the conventional determinants of financial development stemming from arguments of demand for finance and controls for discontinuities created by financial crises.
Regime durability is highly statistically significant in all specifications of the regressions and affects all aspects of financial development. A more representative political system has positive effects on affects all aspects of financial development, with the greatest and most robust effects in the late 1990s. We therefore provide empirical evidence for the arguments made in the political economy literature on financial development. More autocratic regimes representing the interests of narrow but powerful elites appear to delay and obstruct financial development. 49 Once we control for the degree to which a narrow elite controls the levers of power, whether or not the legal system is based on a civil law code no longer appears to matter.
A further strong message is that political upheaval (regardless of whether this is a move towards democracy or autocracy or a state failure) is detrimental to financial development. This result provides an additional explanation for the patterns of financial development observed in Rajan and Zingales (2003) Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Robust standard errors in parentheses significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Notes: 1. The null hypothesis of the Hansen's J-test states that the instruments used in the GMM estimations are valid 2. The tests of exogeneity is a Hausman test which examines the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference between the OLS and GMM estimates. The null hypothesis states that Polity2 is exogenous 3. significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
